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ABSTRACT 
 
There are several perspectives that provide  useful theoretical frameworks  for 
analyzing coopetition based on its original paradigm – competition and cooperation.  
They are transaction–cost economics, resource-based view, game theory, industrial-
organization, socioeconomics and social network analysis.  Theoretical perspectives 
then developed to conceptual frameworks that explain and predict empirical 
phenomena of coopetition. The frameworks of coopetition vary from a continuum with 
cooperation and competition at its ends to the tendency to adopt multidimensionality 
under orthogonal structure between two constructs of competition and cooperation. –  
briefly drawing the typology of coopetition with coopetition and cooperation 
constructs  as its axis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Coopetition is investigated under 
the inter-organizational relationship 
realms. It is lying between two 
diametrically different logics of 
interaction  cooperation and competition 
(Bengtsson and Kock, 2000), from where 
the new research domain also get its 
name.   
 Competition traditionally depicted 
as direct rivalry between firms.  Beneath 
the industrial organization perspective, 
Porter (1986) brings the notions to win 
competition by overcoming the threats or 
power of substitute products, new 
competitors, competitive rivalry, 
customers and suppliers.  The other 
distinguished way to succeed in 
competition is to exploit but at the same 
time to maintain the key resources – that 
is the resources which have the properties 
of being valuable,  rare, in-imitable and 
non-substitutable (Barney, 1986). 
Interweaving  Porter’s five and the VRIN 
properties of key resources, Barney 
(1991) endorses Resource-Based View 
(RBV) the concept Wernerfelt (1984) 
once affirmed.  This approach turns to be 
one of the significant perspective used in 
examining coopetition. 
 Cooperation  is frequently 
considered the antithesis of competition, 
since it is a recursive process where two 
or more firms work together toward an 
intersection of common  goals.  Within 
the cooperative paradigm, the business 
world is composed of a network of 
interdependent relationships developed 
and fostered through strategic 
collaboration with the goal of deriving 
mutual benefits  (Contractor and Lorange, 
1988 in Lado, Boyd, and Hanlon, 1997).  
The inter-firm cooperation agreement 
means a strategic option of adjustment to 
gain access to resources that firm does 
not have but are indispensable for its 
sustainability or progress.  Quintana-
Garcıa and Benavides-Velasco (2004) 
elaborate resources as abilities and 
knowledge and sustainability and 
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progress narrowly refer to new product 
development process.  
 Coopetition gets its paradox from 
the simultaneously existence of 
cooperation and competition in the 
relationship.  On one side, coopetition 
deals with enmity due to conflicting 
interests related to obtain competitive 
advantage and on the other side with 
necessity to develop trust and mutual 
commitment to achieve common aims, 
both towards the same entity.  Several 
theoretical perspectives have been used to 
analyze this new stream of research area, 
they are resource-based view, game 
theory, transaction–cost economics,  
socio-economics and social network 
analysis.  Researchers tend to intertwine 
the perspectives rather to use a single one 
to explain the phenomenon.  
  
THE PERSPECTIVES  
 
Resource-Based View. 
 
 From Resource based-view, 
competitive advantage comes from 
owning valuable, rare, inimitable, non-
substitutable capabilities that allow the 
firm to offer its customers better value 
than competitors.   Fundamentally, two 
assumptions underpin this approach: (a) 
firms are heterogeneous with respect to 
their resource profiles and (b) those 
resources are not perfectly mobile across 
firms (Barney, 1991).  Sustained 
differences in firms' profits may be 
attributed to differences in resources and 
not necessarily to a particular industry's 
structural conditions. Accordingly, 
unique resources and capabilities enable 
the firm to generate economic rents, 
leading to sustained competitive 
advantage. 
  Based on how economic rent are 
generated and sustained, two approaches 
then develop form RBV perspective.  The 
first perspective emphasizes the 
importance of VRIN properties of 
resource to guarantee the creation and 
furthermore the sustainability of firm’s 
competitive advantage.  The other 
approach evolves around the idea of how 
sustainability of  competitive advantage 
strongly depends on firm’s ability to 
develop capabilities for innovations.  This 
dynamic capability-based approach 
emphasizes skill acquisition, learning and 
capability accumulation which provide a 
convenient basis on which the 
accumulation of resource stock through 
coopetition will be examined. 
 
Game Theory 
 
 Game  theory represents another 
conceptual framework for examining the 
potential of rent creation through 
coopetition strategy (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996). According to Okura 
(2007) game theory has the following 
three advantages for analyzing the 
coopetition.  First, game theory can 
contain some strategic interactions among 
direct firms (competitor), the industrial 
profits entirely are related not only to a 
firm’s decisions, but also to those of 
others. Second, game theory can 
represent a complex situation by a very 
simple model.  Game theory permits 
analyzing a complex situation by 
distinguishing in an analytical fashion the 
cooperative and competitive issues that 
are interwoven in the real world situation. 
Third, game theory gives a very rigorous 
analytical methods.  
 In the terminology of game 
theory, coopetition can be depicted as an 
extensive-form game containing both 
cooperative (positive-sum game) and 
competitive (zero-sum game) stages.  By 
this nature, coopetition can be viewed as 
“variable-positive-sum game”. The 
solution of an extensive-form game is 
expressed as sub-game perfect 
equilibrium. This equilibrium can be 
derived using backward induction, which 
means solving the optimal choice of the 
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last stages in all possible situations and 
then working backward to compute the 
optimal choice.  Mathematical analysis on 
the equilibrium is the backbone of this 
perspective. 
 
Industrial Organization Socio-
economics - Social Network Analysis. 
 
Beside game theory and RBV, Lado 
et. al. (1997) also exploit socioeconomics 
perspective to explore coopetitive 
behavior of firms.   By socioeconomics 
approaches, Lado, et al. (1997) fuse 
economical, sociological, psychological 
(behavior studies) even mention 
biological approaches to conclude the 
main idea that firms are not just economic 
beings, they are also social ones.  The 
firms tied in certain norms and ethics, so 
beside maximizing their utility function, 
they are also considering the moral 
sentiment and/or value.   
 Bengtsson and Kock (2000) 
combine the perspective of industrial 
organization (economics) and network 
perspective when depicting the 
paradoxical nature of coopetition.   
Network approach which focuses more in 
the (both vertical or horizontal) 
relationships adjoined with industrial 
organization which interests is on the 
industry structure.  With these 
perspective, the cooperation and the 
competition can be denoted to happen 
within a coopetitive relationship 
involving the same entities.  The 
dominance degree whether of cooperation 
or competition in the coopetitive 
relationship together with the 
propositions become the significant 
results from this study. 
 I found network approaches go 
along with the focus of socioeconomics 
perspective.   The idea of network 
embeddedness  from  Gnyawali  and 
Madhavan (2001) confirm how behaviors 
of a firm give impacts on the entire 
networks and vice versa.   This viewpoint 
also gives space for explanation on the 
dynamic of coopetitive relationship.  The 
relationship changes the direction over 
certain time range due to the interactions 
happened in the network. This approach 
also frequently used to confirm the 
knowledge and technological (and other 
resources, e.g. trust (Castaldo and 
Dagnino, 2004)) flows in the relationship.   
 Social network analysis is built 
based on an assumption of the importance 
of relationships among interacting units. 
The social network perspective 
encompasses theories, models, and 
applications that are expressed in terms of 
relational concepts or processes.   A 
“social network” is defined as a group of 
collaborating entities that are related to 
each other. Mathematically, this is a 
graph (or a multi-graph); each participant 
in the collaboration is called an actor and 
depicted as a node in the graph. Actors 
can be persons, organizations, or 
groups—any set of related entities.  
Valued relations between actors are 
depicted as links between the 
corresponding nodes.  
 Four things related to actors, 
relations, network focus and structure are 
considered important in social network 
analysis.  First, actors and their actions 
are viewed as interdependent rather than 
independent, autonomous units.  Second, 
relational ties (linkages) between actors 
are channels for transfer or "flow" of 
resources (either material or nonmaterial).  
Next, network models focusing on 
individuals view the network structural 
environment as providing opportunities 
for or constraints on individual action.  
And network models conceptualize 
structure (social, economic, political, and 
so forth) as lasting patterns of relations 
among actors. The unit of analysis in 
network analysis is not the individual, but 
an entity consisting of a collection of 
individuals and the linkages among them. 
Network methods focus on dyads (two 
actors and their ties), triads (three actors 
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and their ties), or larger systems 
(subgroups of individuals, or entire 
networks (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
 In explaining the structure of the 
network, social network analysis 
introduced the network centralization 
indices.   Network centralization indices 
explain the topology of the network.  
Network may have one (or more) actor(s) 
that dominate(s) as in the star topology; 
or the connectedness is equally 
distributed  among nodes and forms the 
circle topology.  As for the importance of 
every actors in the network, social 
network analysis used the unit centrality 
measures.  Both network centralization 
indices and unit centrality measures 
consist of degree, closeness and 
betweenness measures.  Degree centrality 
measure represents number of ties an 
actor has with other actors in the network.  
Closeness centrality represents number of 
shortest path an actor has with other 
actors in the network. Betweenness 
centrality of an actor indicates the number 
of relations between two other actors in 
the network that regard it as connecting 
node. 
 Drawn from Burt's (1992) 
influential work on structural holes, 
structural autonomy is a key actor-level 
property: a structurally autonomous actor 
has structural holes between the actors it 
is connected to but is free of structural 
holes at its own end. If actor A has ties to 
both B and C but B and C are not tied 
directly to each other-that is, B and C can 
reach each other only through A-a 
structural hole exists between B and C, 
which can be exploited by A. Structural 
holes enhance information benefits in 
several ways: diversity of contacts across 
unconnected groups means less 
redundancy and higher quality of 
information, earlier access to new 
information, and inclusion in more 
interactions. Similarly, a network rich in 
structural holes presents opportunities for 
control, in that the focal actor can "put a 
spin on" information flows between 
disconnected actors.  While structural 
holes are the underlying phenomena, 
structural autonomy is the network 
property of actors who have relationships 
free of structural holes at their own end 
and rich in structural holes at the other 
end. (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001).  
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). 
 
 According to Williamson (1998), 
transaction cost economics (TCE) is the 
interdisciplinary field of law, economics 
and organization, dealing with 
governance of transactions, adopting a 
contractual approach to economic 
organization. A transaction (exchange) 
occurs when a good or service is 
transferred across a technically separable 
interface. Governance is the means to 
accomplish order in an exchange 
relationship, in which potential conflict 
threatens to diminish mutual gains.  TCE 
doesn’t not estrange friction in the inter-
firm relationship, in fact friction becomes 
the engine of the economic system.   
 Much of the TCE literature 
centers on make-or-buy decisions, with 
choice of mode influenced by the markets 
for those goods and necessary 
investments in facilities to produce or 
utilize those goods (Park and Russo, 
1996).  Eriksson (2006) then continue the 
tradition by associating the three 
dimensions of TCE, (i.e.: asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency) 
with the three different structures and the 
governance mechanism, that is market – 
price, hierarchy – authority and hybrids – 
trust to build the model for procurement 
procedure of construction firms.   Even 
though the empirical results do not agree 
with the proposed hypothesis, yet the 
model succeeds to capture the description 
of client and contractor relationship that 
is still dominated by the competitive 
behaviors. 
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FRAMEWORKS 
From Perspectives to Frameworks. 
 
  Some distinguished coopetition 
propositions, hypothesis and frameworks 
developed from thorough exposition of 
theoretical perspectives.  Among the 
earliest framework which still used as 
references is the Syncretic Model of 
Rent-Seeking Strategic Behavior by Lado 
et al. (1997).  Figure 1 depicts the model 
rigidly formulated on the basis of RBV, 
game theory and socioeconomic 
perspectives.   Syncretic rent-seeking 
behavior in this model places the
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1    A Syncretic Model of Rent-Seeking Strategic Behavior 
(Lado, et al. – 1997) 
 
coopetition among other possible 
behaviors.  So the dialectical perspective 
of coopetition suggested by 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) not 
only seen as a single unit  composed by 
two extremes that is pure cooperation and 
pure competition (see Figure  2).
 
 
 
 
Figure 2    Competition –  Cooperation Dimension 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff , 1996) 
 
 
The dimension then developed by 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000) using the 
network and industrial organization 
(economics) and network approaches 
makes the dimension appeared with more 
details about the coopetition continuum 
(see Figure 3).   Galvagno and Garraffo 
(2008) add the element of time and 
direction to the continuum to accentuate 
the dynamic of coopetitive relationship.  
It changes its direction over a particular 
time span. 
 
 
Cooperative 
Orientation 
High 
Low 
Competitive 
Orientation 
HighLow 
Collaborative Rent-Seeking 
Behavior 
Monopolistic Rent-Seeking 
Behavior 
Syncretic  Rent-Seeking 
Behavior 
Competitive Rent-Seeking 
Behavior 
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Figure 3 Types of Coopetitive Relationship 
(Bengtsson and Kock, 2000) 
 
 
Examples of the similar framework 
built on the basis of socio- (includes the 
psychological)-economic perspectives 
also given by Castaldo and Dagnino 
(2004).  Coopetition in the study 
composed in two dimensions, that is: (1) 
content dimension which covers social 
and economic aspects and (2) process 
dimension that includes competition and 
cooperation.  The basic concept of 
coopetition is shown in Figure 4.   This 
description of dimension then followed 
by other several descriptions of 
coopetition typologies drawn on the same 
axis.
  
 
Figure 4  Basic Concept of Coopetition (Castaldo and Dagnino – 2004) 
 
The work of Castaldo and Dagnino 
(2004) eventually develop what Mandal 
(2004) summarizes as conventional 
cooperation competition framework 
(Figure 5).  Coopetition is defined as 
multidimensional variable, which may 
assume a number of different values, 
especially when observed in an 
orthogonal structure between the two 
constructs of competition and 
cooperation.
 
 
Pure 
Cooperation 
Cooperation-
dominated 
Relationship 
Equal Relationship Competition-
dominated 
Relationship 
Pure 
Competition 
Coopetition 
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Figure 5 Conventional Cooperation Competition Framework (Mandal, 2004) 
 
CONCLUSION 
Galvagno and Garraffo (2008) 
conclude that coopetition has not had any 
well-defined theoretical perspective yet.  
The prominent perspective applied for 
scrutinizing coopetition are resource 
based-view, game theory, transactions 
cost economics and social network 
analysis.  Researchers tend to intertwine 
the perspectives rather to use a single one 
to explain the phenomenon. This 
propensity is performed to consider 
coopetition as a new entity, not only a 
hybrid of its main paradigms, cooperation 
and competition.   
 Yet to date, coopetition is mostly 
explained and examined using theoretical 
perspectives that treat competition and 
cooperation as two paradigm separately.   
This fact leads to the lack of conceptual 
framework that can explain and predict 
empirical phenomena of coopetition. 
Multidimensionality that accommodates 
orthogonality seems potential to depict 
the typology of coopetition.  Exploring 
other theoretical perspectives and 
developing conceptual frameworks 
definitely become important stages to 
confirm coopetition as new form of 
research field in management strategic.  
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